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Write a 1,750- to 2,450-word critical analysis paper comparing the emergency response protocols for the following critical incidents:
1979: Three Mile Island nuclear disaster
1984: Bhopal India Union Carbide incident
2007: I-35W bridge collapse in Minnesota
Include the following in your critical analysis paper:
Compare how emergency response teams responded to each incident and the actions they took. How did the responses vary and why?
Describe the timeliness of the emergency response teams.
Explain the cause of each critical incident.
Identify communication issues that emergency response teams faced in responding to these critical incidents.
1979: Three Mile Island nuclear disaster
Brief: In 1979, in nuclear power plant in USA at Three Mile Island, due to some cooling malfunction a part of the core melted in a #2 reactor. Due to which the TMI-2 reactor was destroyed. A few days after the accident, some radioactive gas was released however, it did not cause any harm to the local residents and no injuries or cases of adverse effects from the Three Mile Island accident was seen.
Causes:
1.) Inadequate failure information system: there were issues with the failure information system present in the control room which caused inadequate emergency response by their operators. It was seen that the view of LED was blocked by the warning sign which indicated the closing of feedwater valve and on closure of the valve a green LED was lit. Furthermore, the level of water was not indicated by the actual amount of water present in the pressurizer. The operators did not realize that the plant was on the verge of experiencing a loss-of-coolant accident and took various actions making the conditions worse.
2.) Lack of reliability assurance: repeated troubles were seen in the malfunctioned pressurizer relief valve and was highly unreliable. In spite of this particular issue, no replacements were done with the reliable.
3.) Inadequate training of operators: All the contract operators lacked proper knowledge regarding the thermal phenomena and nuclear reactors. They were not even trained for the accident situation.
4.) Unexpected event not in the safety design standards: the safety devices of these nuclear plants were designed for handling various nuclear accidents however, the event that took place were not assumed and no one gave a thought on how to handle this case.
Due to the unplanned automatic shutdown of the reactor, the operators were unable to respond or to diagnose. The root cause of the issue was the deficient control room instrumentation along with the inadequate emergency response training. Due to these problems and confusions among the officials the accident turned worse and an advisory was issued for evacuating the preschool children and the pregnant women present within the 5-mile radius of the Island.
1.) Inadequate failure information system: there were issues with the failure information system present in the control room which caused inadequate emergency response by their operators. It was seen that the view of LED was blocked by the warning sign which indicated the closing of feedwater valve and on closure of the valve a green LED was lit. Furthermore, the level of water was not indicated by the actual amount of water present in the pressurizer. The operators did not realize that the plant was on the verge of experiencing a loss-of-coolant accident and took various actions making the conditions worse.
2.) Lack of reliability assurance: repeated troubles were seen in the malfunctioned pressurizer relief valve and was highly unreliable. In spite of this particular issue, no replacements were done with the reliable.
3.) Inadequate training of operators: All the contract operators lacked proper knowledge regarding the thermal phenomena and nuclear reactors. They were not even trained for the accident situation.
4.) Unexpected event not in the safety design standards: the safety devices of these nuclear plants were designed for handling various nuclear accidents however, the event that took place were not assumed and no one gave a thought on how to handle this case.
Due to the unplanned automatic shutdown of the reactor, the operators were unable to respond or to diagnose. The root cause of the issue was the deficient control room instrumentation along with the inadequate emergency response training. Due to these problems and confusions among the officials the accident turned worse and an advisory was issued for evacuating the preschool children and the pregnant women present within the 5-mile radius of the Island.
Action taken by the Emergency Response Team
Due to the atmosphere of total confusion among the team, the response lacked all the key recommendations. The TMI management as well as the engineering personnel had various difficulties while analyzing the events. Significant delays were seen to occur even after the supervisory personnel took the charge even before the core damage. The key TMI-2 operating and the emergency procedures took place including LOCA procedure and the operation of pressurizer were found to be inadequate causing confusion among the operators. During the first two days of the disaster the communication channel between the site and the NRC Incident Response Center in Maryland where all the senior management people were located was found to be extremely difficult so as to obtain all the up-to-date data and information. Therefore the senior management did not develop a thorough understanding of the site conditions. Therefore the decision of evacuation which was recommended by the NRC senior staff was done on the basis of the erroneous information which was highly partial and even fragmentary (ThePresident's Commission On The Accidental Three Mile Island, 1979).
Due to the atmosphere of total confusion among the team, the response lacked all the key recommendations. The TMI management as well as the engineering personnel had various difficulties while analyzing the events. Significant delays were seen to occur even after the supervisory personnel took the charge even before the core damage. The key TMI-2 operating and the emergency procedures took place including LOCA procedure and the operation of pressurizer were found to be inadequate causing confusion among the operators. During the first two days of the disaster the communication channel between the site and the NRC Incident Response Center in Maryland where all the senior management people were located was found to be extremely difficult so as to obtain all the up-to-date data and information. Therefore the senior management did not develop a thorough understanding of the site conditions. Therefore the decision of evacuation which was recommended by the NRC senior staff was done on the basis of the erroneous information which was highly partial and even fragmentary (ThePresident's Commission On The Accidental Three Mile Island, 1979).
Lessons Learnt:
1.) Responsibility for operation belongs to the management, and not to any federal or state government or regulators.
2.) The operating crew and its competence is highly vital. The dangerous technologies like nuclear power and chemical plants.as all these include human in their operation it can lead to the financial damage along with the societal damage. Therefore care must ne taken.
1.) Responsibility for operation belongs to the management, and not to any federal or state government or regulators.
2.) The operating crew and its competence is highly vital. The dangerous technologies like nuclear power and chemical plants.as all these include human in their operation it can lead to the financial damage along with the societal damage. Therefore care must ne taken.
1984: Bhopal India Union Carbide incident
Brief: The Bhopal disaster is also known as the Bhopal gas tragedy which is a gas leak incident in India and is the world’s worst industrial disaster. This incident took place on the night of 2-3 December 1984, at a pesticide plant Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. Due to the exposure from the methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and other chemicals. The shanty towns which were located near the plant were surrounded by the toxic substance (Nair, n.d.).
Causes:
1.) Underinvestment: The UCIL managers considered high cost cutting leading to the lower attention being paid towards the maintenance and the safety standards. Due to underinvestment no maintenance supervisor was placed at the night shifts. Furthermore, the plant had introduced a careless washing method which started a powerful exothermic reaction in the plant and its construction in a place with dense population.
2.) Adequacy of equipment and safety regulations:
The set up was not well equipped for handling the gas which was created by addition of water in the MIC tank. These tanks had only one manual back-up system and all the vent gas scrubbers and the flare tower had been out of service for around five months before the disaster took place. During the time of the accident only one gas scrubber was operating which was not able to treat huge amount of MIC along with the caustic soda.
3.) Safety audits
Almost all the policies and routines along with the supervisors and the employees were not followed which might have helped in the prevention of the disaster. Had all the policies were followed the alarming of the tank pressure along with the postponing of their tea break would not have happened (Broughton, 2005).
The plant’s alarm system was triggered by a UCIL employee in the early morning at 12:00 a.m. due to difficulty in tolerating the concentration of the gas. Due to the activation of the system, two siren alarms: one sounding inside the plant and another outwards towards the public. The UCIL members and staff on being telephoned by the police officials between 1:25 a.m. and 2:10 a.m. replied that everything was under control. Due to the lack of timely exchange of information among the Bhopal authorities and the UCIL members. Furthermore, the hospital staff had never heard about MIC and had no antidote for it, further were not even notified by the official on receiving immediate information.
1.) Underinvestment: The UCIL managers considered high cost cutting leading to the lower attention being paid towards the maintenance and the safety standards. Due to underinvestment no maintenance supervisor was placed at the night shifts. Furthermore, the plant had introduced a careless washing method which started a powerful exothermic reaction in the plant and its construction in a place with dense population.
2.) Adequacy of equipment and safety regulations:
The set up was not well equipped for handling the gas which was created by addition of water in the MIC tank. These tanks had only one manual back-up system and all the vent gas scrubbers and the flare tower had been out of service for around five months before the disaster took place. During the time of the accident only one gas scrubber was operating which was not able to treat huge amount of MIC along with the caustic soda.
3.) Safety audits
Almost all the policies and routines along with the supervisors and the employees were not followed which might have helped in the prevention of the disaster. Had all the policies were followed the alarming of the tank pressure along with the postponing of their tea break would not have happened (Broughton, 2005).
The plant’s alarm system was triggered by a UCIL employee in the early morning at 12:00 a.m. due to difficulty in tolerating the concentration of the gas. Due to the activation of the system, two siren alarms: one sounding inside the plant and another outwards towards the public. The UCIL members and staff on being telephoned by the police officials between 1:25 a.m. and 2:10 a.m. replied that everything was under control. Due to the lack of timely exchange of information among the Bhopal authorities and the UCIL members. Furthermore, the hospital staff had never heard about MIC and had no antidote for it, further were not even notified by the official on receiving immediate information.
Lessons learnt:
1.) The primary step of preventing a disaster of huge magnitude in future is to first sign the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government and the Company where all the concerns of the company are made clear to it and the responsibilities of the company must be told in case of any such incident. The company must be asked to pay half of the compensation to the victims and to the government they signed the memorandum with.
2.) The second step that needs to be taken is that the victim should not be asked to provide evidence to get his/her compensation. This means that the tort law should not be used where the victim has to provide evidence for getting compensation.
3.) Various corporate responsibility and accident prevention and other techniques must be focused on by the international agencies and the national government. These preventions should include the design, safety legislation and the risk reduction in the location of the plant (Broughton, 2005).
1.) The primary step of preventing a disaster of huge magnitude in future is to first sign the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government and the Company where all the concerns of the company are made clear to it and the responsibilities of the company must be told in case of any such incident. The company must be asked to pay half of the compensation to the victims and to the government they signed the memorandum with.
2.) The second step that needs to be taken is that the victim should not be asked to provide evidence to get his/her compensation. This means that the tort law should not be used where the victim has to provide evidence for getting compensation.
3.) Various corporate responsibility and accident prevention and other techniques must be focused on by the international agencies and the national government. These preventions should include the design, safety legislation and the risk reduction in the location of the plant (Broughton, 2005).
I-35W Mississippi River Bridge
I-35W Mississippi River Bridge known as Bridge 9340 was a steel truss arch bridge was an eight-lane bridge which carried the carried Interstate 35W across the Saint Anthony Falls of the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States. On 1st August 2007 the bridge collapsed suddenly which injured 145 and around 13 succumbed to death. It is the third busiest bridge of the Minnesota which carried 140,000 vehicles. After this incident a replacement bridge was planned and the construction started rapidly. The bridge reopened on 18th September 2008 (Zhu, S. et al, 2010).
Cause:
1.) A design flaw was considered to be a factor as cited by NTSB after noting down the too-thin gusset plate which were ripped along with the rivets lines.
2.) It was said that the additional weight was put on the bridge during the collapse time. Along with the incorrect plate size and the loads of construction which was added on the corrosion overtime.
3.) Insufficient reviewing and approving of the bridge design plans along with the calculations by the Federal and State procedures.
4.) The bridge owners were not guided well regarding the placement of the construction loans during the maintenance or repair activities.
5.) The inspection guidance regarding the gusset plate and their distortion was not provided.
6.) The technology was not used for assessing the gusset plates and their conditions.
1.) A design flaw was considered to be a factor as cited by NTSB after noting down the too-thin gusset plate which were ripped along with the rivets lines.
2.) It was said that the additional weight was put on the bridge during the collapse time. Along with the incorrect plate size and the loads of construction which was added on the corrosion overtime.
3.) Insufficient reviewing and approving of the bridge design plans along with the calculations by the Federal and State procedures.
4.) The bridge owners were not guided well regarding the placement of the construction loans during the maintenance or repair activities.
5.) The inspection guidance regarding the gusset plate and their distortion was not provided.
6.) The technology was not used for assessing the gusset plates and their conditions.
Emergency response:
The Minnesota State Patrol was notified by calling on 911 system. The collapse was confirmed using the Minnesota Department of Transportation (Mn/DOT) freeway camera system and was combined with the emergency dispatch center for the police as well as the fire departments. The call was made at 6:07 p.m. and at 6:08 p.m. The 911 dispatch declared a distress call over the interstate radio system which requested the available emergency assistance for responding to the I-35W Bridge. Immediately after this collapse the help arrived from the mutual aid in the seven-country seven-county Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan area along with the charities, volunteers and the emergency response personnel. The Minneapolis Police Department unit and 19 engine units from the Minneapolis Fire Department reached on the scene at 6:10 p.m. The Hennepin County Medical Center on its arrival started initiating the disaster plan and called all the hospital and started dispatching the ambulances to the scene (National Transportation Safety Board, 2007).
The Minnesota State Patrol was notified by calling on 911 system. The collapse was confirmed using the Minnesota Department of Transportation (Mn/DOT) freeway camera system and was combined with the emergency dispatch center for the police as well as the fire departments. The call was made at 6:07 p.m. and at 6:08 p.m. The 911 dispatch declared a distress call over the interstate radio system which requested the available emergency assistance for responding to the I-35W Bridge. Immediately after this collapse the help arrived from the mutual aid in the seven-country seven-county Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan area along with the charities, volunteers and the emergency response personnel. The Minneapolis Police Department unit and 19 engine units from the Minneapolis Fire Department reached on the scene at 6:10 p.m. The Hennepin County Medical Center on its arrival started initiating the disaster plan and called all the hospital and started dispatching the ambulances to the scene (National Transportation Safety Board, 2007).
Comparison
In the first two cases the response of emergency dominated due to the confusion among the employees and staff. All the important recommendations provided to the employees were not accurate and sufficient and people managing the accidents were highly slow in realizing the implication of the events. The employees and staff did their best to avoid to the situation but they were not knowledgeable enough to comprehend with the situation. However in the third case, the authorities were highly equipped with the preparedness and the related skills which led to a better quality of response as compared to the other two. Both the cases lacked a planned communication efforts in order to tackle the situation. Furthermore, no expenses were spent on repairing of the damaged parts. On the contrary, despite the flaw in the design a proper communication effort was seen in the third case. Although in all the three cases the plant designers did not help in the design and the layout of the plant where the key indicators were seen to be placed haphazardly.
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Nair, M. Bhopal Gas Tragedy – A Social, Economic, Legal and Environmental Analysis. SSRN Electronic Journal. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1977710
Broughton, E. (2005). The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review. Environmental Health, 4(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1476-069x-4-6
Zhu, S., Levinson, D., Liu, H. X., & Harder, K. (2010). The traffic and behavioral effects of the I-35W Mississippi River bridge collapse.Transportation research part A: policy and practice, 44(10), 771-784.
National Transportation Safety Board,. (2007). Collapse of I-35W Highway Bridge Minneapolis, Minnesota August 1, 2007. Washington.
ThePresident's Commission On The Accidental Three Mile Island,. (1979). The Accidental Three Mile Island. Washington.
Broughton, E. (2005). The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review. Environmental Health, 4(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1476-069x-4-6
Zhu, S., Levinson, D., Liu, H. X., & Harder, K. (2010). The traffic and behavioral effects of the I-35W Mississippi River bridge collapse.Transportation research part A: policy and practice, 44(10), 771-784.
National Transportation Safety Board,. (2007). Collapse of I-35W Highway Bridge Minneapolis, Minnesota August 1, 2007. Washington.
ThePresident's Commission On The Accidental Three Mile Island,. (1979). The Accidental Three Mile Island. Washington.
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